WHERE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE IRAQ WAR ARE STILL BEING FELT.

HE HAS NEVER ADMITTED THAT HIS WAR WAS A MISTAKE.

I LIKE HIS OFFICIALS.

OUR NEXT GUEST TACKLES THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN HIS NEW BOOK.

HERE HE IS NOW.

>> THANK YOU.

WELCOME TO THE SHOW.

>> DELIGHTED TO BE WITH YOU.>> TODAY MARKS THE 20th ANNIVERSARY OF THE INVASION OF IRAQ.

YOU'RE RIGHT THAT WAS THE MOST CONSEQUENTIAL AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ACT OF THE 21st CENTURY.

WHAT WERE THE CONSEQUENCES?

>> THERE WERE MANY.

FIRST OFF KEEP IN MIND THAT IT LED TO THE DEATHS OF OVER 200,000 IRAQIS AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF ABOUT 9 MILLION IRAQIS.

IT LED TO THE DEATHS OF APPROXIMATELY 9000 AMERICAN SOLDIERS AND PRIVATE CONTRACTORS.

IT WILL COST THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OVER TIME APPROXIMATELY $2 TRILLION.

GEOPOLITICALLY IT HAS SIGNIFICANT CONSEQUENCES AS WELL.

A DIVERTED AMERICAN ATTENTION FROM THE ONGOING WAR IN AFGHANISTAN.

IT ALLOWED IRAN TO BECOME PREDOMINANT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

IT DIVIDED AMERICA FROM ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES.

HOWEVER BRIEFLY.

A DISTRACTED THE ATTENTION FROM THE RISE OF CHINA.

FROM RUSSIA.

GEOPOLITICALLY, HE HAD SIGNIFICANT CONSEQUENCES AS WELL.

>> THEN WE THINK THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS A REALLY BAD THREAT AND WE HAD TO DO THIS?

WERE THESE WELL-INTENTIONED DECISIONS?

>> YES THEY WERE.

AS I DESCRIBED IN MY BOOK, HE WAS A BRUTAL CRUEL DICTATOR WHO HAD DEVELOPED WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND WHO HAS USED THEM.

MANY CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

BOTH AGAINST HIS OWN PEOPLE AND THE IRANIANS.

HE HAD LIED ABOUT HIS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

HE HAD CONCEALED THEM.

HE WAS OVERALL A CHARACTER WHO COULD NOT AT ALL BE TRUSTED.

I THINK WHAT I TRY TO PERCENT IN MY BOOK IS THAT THERE WERE GOOD REASONS FOR AMERICAN POLICYMAKERS TO BE EXTREMELY DISTRUSTFUL AND SUSPICIOUS OF HIM.

ESPECIALLY AFTER THE SHOCK OF 9- 11.

THAT DOES NOT MEAN I AM WRITING THAT THE WAR WAS JUSTIFIED.

IT DOES MEAN THAT POLICYMAKERS WERE ACTING OUT OF GOOD INTENTIONS.

THEY CERTAINLY WANTED TO PREVENT THE UNITED STATES FROM SUFFERING ANOTHER ATTACK LIKE THE 199-11.

>> I WANT TO DRILL DOWN ON THE QUESTION OF WHY DID GEORGE W. BUSH DO THIS?

THERE ARE MANY THEORIES WEAVING THROUGH YOUR BOOK AND OTHER PLACES.

SOME OF WHICH HAD TO DO WITH HIS FATHER.

THE WAY HIS FATHER CONDUCTED THE FIRST GULF WAR.

SOME SAY IT WAS ADVISORS LIKE THAT WHO DROVE HIM INTO IT.

WHO HAD UNDUE INFLUENCE ON HIM.

SOME SAY IT WAS A HOPE FOG IN CONFUSION.

SOME SAY HE REALLY DID BELIEVE IN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.

THAT HE WOULD CREATE DEMOCRACY.

WHAT DO YOU THINK THE MOTIVATIONS REALLY WORK?

>> THE OVERRIDING MOTIVATION WAS HERE AND A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT ANOTHER ATTACK.

THE ALLEGATIONS THAT HE WAS TRYING TO REDRESS THE MISTAKES OF HIS FATHER OR GET EVEN WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN FOR HIS EFFORT TO ASSASSINATE HIS FATHER.

THERE SEEMS TO BE NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THOSE WERE REAL FACTORS.

PRESIDENT BUSH REALLY WAS EXTRAORDINARILY WORRIED ABOUT ANOTHER ATTACK.

HE HAD REASON TO BE WORRIED ABOUT IT.

BASED ON EVIDENCE THAT AL QAEDA DID SEEK TO ATTACK THE UNITED STATES AGAIN.

THE NOTIONS THAT DICK CHENEY WAS MAKING POLICY.

THOSE GENERALIZATIONS ARE SIMPLY NOT WELL-FOUNDED IF YOU LOOK CAREFULLY AT THE EVIDENCE.

THE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT HE WAS MOTIVATED PRINCIPALLY BY FEAR.

PRESIDENT BUSH ALSO BELIEVED HE HAD THE CAPACITY AND CAPABILITIES.

THE POWER TO DEAL WITH THIS PERCEPTION OF THREAT.

IT IS REALLY FEAR AND POWER.

THAT MOTIVATED HIM.

>> IN YOUR BOOK, THERE IS A SCENE THAT ILLUSTRATES ONE OF THE FEELINGS THAT HAPPEN IN U.S. POLICY.

I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU DISCUSS IT.

YOU TALK ABOUT PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH SAYING CAN WE WIN.

HE SAYS CAN WE GET RID OF SADDAM HUSSEIN?

>> YES.

THEN YOU SAY THE PRESIDENT DID NOT ASK WHAT 10.

WHY WAS THAT THE PROBLEM?

>> THAT WAS A TREMENDOUS PROBLEM.

THERE WAS AN ADEQUATE ATTENTION.

TO WHAT THE WAR PLAN IS DEFINED AS PHASE 4 OF THE WAR EFFORT.

THE POSTWAR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION TIME PERIOD.

OTHER TOP OFFICIALS.

THEY ACTUALLY SPENT A LOT OF TIME TALKING ABOUT THE INITIAL PHASES OF THE WAR PLAN.

WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO TOPPLE SADDAM HUSSEIN.

THEY DID NOT SPEND MUCH TIME ON WHAT IT WOULD TAKE TO PRESERVE ORDER AND STABILITY.

ENSURE SECURITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE GOVERNMENT BEING TOPPLED.

THERE WAS ENORMOUS CONFUSION.

THERE WAS ENORMOUS CHAOS.

ENORMOUS DISORDER.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE REGIME WAS TOPPLED.

THE UNITED STATES DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT TROOPS WERE SUFFICIENT PLANES TO REALLY DEAL WITH THE DYNAMICS OF THE SITUATION.

THE ADMINISTRATION MUST BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INADEQUATE PLANNING FOR PHASE 4.

>> ISN'T THAT WHY WE HAVE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY?

WHY DID THE CIA KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR.

>> THAT IS A VERY DIFFICULT THING TO DO.

PREDICTING THE FUTURE IS INFUSED WITH INCOME DRIBBLES.

ONE MUST SAY THAT MAY HAPPEN AFTER THE WAR MIGHT HAVE BEEN VERY DIFFERENT IF THE UNITED STATES HAS SUFFICIENT FORCES TO PRESERVE ORDER IMMEDIATELY.

IT IS THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO TRY TO PREDICT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN.

IN FACT IN JANUARY 2003, THERE WERE 2 INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS THAT IN BROAD STROKES DID NOT PREDICT THAT THERE WOULD BE THE TYPE OF CHAOS THAT EMERGED BUT SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS A POSSIBILITY.

THE TOP POLICYMAKERS DID NOT REALLY PAY ENOUGH ATTENTION TO WHAT WAS LIKELY TO HAPPEN.

THEY DID NOT PAY ATTENTION TO THOSE TWO INTELLIGENT REPORTS THAT EMERGED IN JANUARY OF 2003.

ONE OF THE POINTS TO EMPHASIZE IS THAT THE POLICYMAKERS FOR EXAMPLE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

SOME OF HIS SUBORDINATES IN THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF IN THE DIVISION.

THESE PEOPLE WERE VERY SKEPTICAL OF GOING INTO IRAQ.

VERY SKEPTICAL.

THEY NEVER PRESENTED A SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF WHAT WAS LIKELY TO HAPPEN.

>> LET ME READ YOU A SENTENCE.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO SET A STORY RIGHT.

WITH THE DILEMMAS OF STATECRAFT.

BY SIMPLIFYING THE STORY.

IF WE ONLY HAD MORE HONEST OFFICIALS.

A WISER POLICYMAKER.

WHY WAS IT NOT TRUE.

>> IT IS BECAUSE BEING WISE IS DIFFICULT.

WHEN I TRIED TO SHOW IN THIS BOOK.

DECISION-MAKING IS TOUGH.

THEY ARE REAL LESSONS TO BE EXTRAPOLATED FROM THIS DECISION TO GO TO WAR.

AMERICAN POLICYMAKERS NEED TO BE ABLE TO CALCULATE THREATS MORE CAREFULLY.

AMERICANS NEED TO MODULATE THEIR FEARS.

THEY NEED TO BE ABLE TO DETERMINE MUCH MORE ACCURATELY.

WHEN THERE IS OR IS NOT A EXISTENTIAL THREAT.

THEY ALSO NEED TO GRASP THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN POWER.

THE UNITED STATES HAD THE POWER.

AMERICAN POLICYMAKERS THOUGHT THEY COULD ACHIEVE WHAT THEY WANTED TO ACHIEVE.

THEY PERCEIVED THREATS.

FROM A PRETTY WEAK NATION OVERALL.

THEY BELIEVE THE EXERCISE OF THEIR POWER WOULD ENABLE THEM RELATIVELY EASILY TO REMOVE THE THREAT THAT THEY PERCEIVED.

ANOTHER LESSON WOULD BE RE- EXAMINED FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS.

THAT IS EASY FOR ME TO SAY.

IT IS EASY FOR MOST PEOPLE TO AGREE.

HOW MANY EXAMINE FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS.

THAT ASSUMPTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY READ EXAMINE.

THEY DID NOT RE-EXAMINE IT.

SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

>> HE SAID IT WAS THE MOST CONSEQUENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY DECISION.

HOW DID IT REVERBERATE.

AND OTHER THINGS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT.

>> I THINK THEY HAD PROFOUND INFLUENCE ON PRESIDENT OBAMA'S INCLINATIONS TO GET DEEPLY INVOLVED.

IN SYRIA.

IT CERTAINLY INFLUENCED HIS INITIAL ACTIONS TO WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM IRAQ.

THEREBY PROVIDING OPPORTUNITY FOR THE ISLAMIC STATE.

TO GAIN MORE AND MORE POWER IN THE REGION.

BEFORE THEY WERE REINSERTED TO STIFLE AND TO DEFEAT THE ISLAMIC STATE.

>> WAS THAT A MISTAKE?

I THINK MANY EXPERTS NOW FEEL THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL.

PROBABLY WAS AN ERROR.

THAT WAS NOT TO SAY THAT PEOPLE THINK ARE I THINK THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN A CONTINUED DEPLOYMENT OF LARGE NUMBERS OF COMBAT TROOPS.

THE CRITICAL FACTOR WAS RATHER TO KEEP IN A SMALL NUMBER OF TROOPS.

THE REALLY BAD PROBLEM THAT WE HAD AFTER THE IRAQI INVASION HAS MADE THE UNITED STATES ALL THE WAY THROUGH.

HOW WE DO NOT KNOW HOW TO CALIBRATE INVOLVEMENTS?

>> IT IS CHASING THE UNITED STATES.

IT HAS MADE POLICYMAKERS THINK VERY DEEPLY ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE.

I THINK THAT IS A GOOD LESSON.

I THINK PEOPLE SHOULD THINK DEEPLY.

FROM THE PERSPECTIVE USE OF FORCE.

IT ALSO CLEARLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE RISE OF THE AMERICA FIRST.

PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP CERTAINLY CAMPAIGNED ON THE NOTION THAT THE FOREVER WARS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ WERE TOTALLY INCONSISTENT WITH AMERICAN INTEREST.

LED TO COMMITMENTS THAT WERE TOTALLY SELF-DEFEATING.

MUCH OF THE GROWING AMERICAN FIRST, MUCH OF THE PRESENT AMERICAN HESITATION.

ESPECIALLY ON THE FAR RIGHT.

EVEN TO GIVE ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE AT THIS VERY MOMENT.

IT GOES BACK TO WHAT DONALD TRUMP AND HIS SUPPORTERS BELIEVE ARE THE LESSONS OF A HANDSTAND AND YOU ROCK.

STAY OUT OF THESE CONFLICTS.

THEY HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH U.S. INTEREST.

THESE PROBLEMS DO AFFECT AMERICAN INTEREST.

THE CHALLENGE FOR POLICYMAKERS.

THE CHALLENGE FOR YOU AND ME IS TO DETERMINE PRECISELY WHAT IS THE NATURE OF OUR INTEREST.

ETC.

HOW IMPORTANT IS THAT INTEREST.

THEN TO DEFINE TACTICS.

WITH THOSE INTEREST.

I WOULD SAY TODAY, PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN IS CAREFULLY CALCULATING THESE ISSUES WITH REGARD TO THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE.

HE UNDERSTANDS THAT UNDETERRED AGGRESSION.

THAT RUSSIAN AGGRESSION LEFT UNMET IS A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT.

BOTH FOR YOUR AND WHAT MAY HAPPEN IN EAST ASIA.

HE UNDERSTANDS THAT.

I THINK HE IS RIGHT ABOUT THAT.

AT THE SAME TIME, HE IS CAREFULLY TRIED TO CALCULATE THAT EVEN THOUGH THAT IS A IMPORTANT INTEREST.

THE PRIORITY IS TO NOT GET ENGAGED IN A FULL-SCALE WAR WITH RUSSIA BECAUSE THAT MAY CULMINATE IN THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

I SEE PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN TRYING CAREFULLY TO CALCULATE THE NATURE OF AMERICAN INTEREST AND TO PRIORITIZE THEM AND DESIGN TECH TAKES THAT ARE COMMENSURATE WITH THE PRIORITIES HE IS ASSIGNING TO THOSE INTEREST.

I THINK THAT IS THE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED HERE.

IT IS NOT YES WE HAVE A INTEREST OR WE DO NOT HAVE A INTEREST.

WE HAVE INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE CHALLENGE IS HOW GREAT ARE THOSE INTEREST AND WHAT SORTS OF TACTICS SHOULD BE EMPLOYED.

>> PROFESSOR, THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR JOINING US.

>> IT HAS BEEN A GREAT PLEASURE TALKING TO YOU.